From Our Philosophy (V): The Realistic Islamic Worldview

The question of worldview is important because it shapes our understanding of self, our interaction with the world, its Creator, and other fellow creations. Our understanding of the world relates to the subject matter of natural and social sciences as well as philosophy and religion. So, for example, in the field of natural sciences, we can ask, how should we approach natural sciences: As a study of objective laws independent of our subjective consciousness or as just our imaginations in mind? Similarly, in the field of social sciences, we can ask, are there any objective patterns or trends that could be found in human social organization and social transformations? Similarly, we can ask, what principles and values should govern our social interactions? What should be our relation to our natural environment? Are humans only mono-dimensional beings, with just material desires and needs? Is there any purpose of this world and our presence in it?

These are important questions for the evaluation of any social and moral system. Shaheed Sadr's aim in Our Philosophy and subsequent books, as discussed earlier, is to outline a social system based on Islamic principles. He therefore considers the discussion of worldview very essential. His approach throughout this and subsequent works has been to critically evaluate and de-construct the established discourses first and then make his constructive contribution informed by his understanding of Islamic principles and values as well as that of philosophy and history.

In the following I take passages from Our Philosophy (here) and supplement them with excerpts from Sadr's another book, Trends of History in Quran (here). You will notice that the discussion done in Part I of Our Philosophy - on the possibility of knowledge through Rational Induction - was necessary so that in Part II Sadr could lay out the salient features of a Realistic Islamic worldview.

The Realistic Islamic Worldview

A) It is a false dilemma to assume that there are only two possible worldviews, the Idealistic and the Materialistic. The Idealistic view, particularly the theological idealism, accords all natural and social occurrences a hidden and divine aspect and interprets them superhumanly. The Materialistic view on the other hand says that nature and history can be fully understood without attributing the real cause to any superhuman factor, and hence God is irrelevant to scientific investigations/explanations.

B) The Realistic worldview asserts that "every phenomenon in life and nature is governed by the causative system and comes into being as the result of a sequence of causes and effects. This sequence exists everywhere in this world. For example, we take into consideration the case of the boiling of water in a kettle. It is a natural phenomenon which depends on certain conditions such as a particular degree of temperature and the nearness of the kettle to fire to a particular extent. This is the case of a sequence of a cause and its effect and a relationship of the present and the past in prearranged conditions."

Causatives also work in the domain of society and history. However, a distinguishing feature here is the intention/consciousness that is involved in the actions of the social actors. The working of nature, like the orbital movement of earth and moon, on the other hand, does not require that consciousness or intention on its part.

The effects of human actions on social and historical course depend, to a considerable extent, on the intentions behind them. This is where human volition/agency and subjectivity (basic instincts, material drives, beliefs and values, culture) become very important.

And related to human agency, there is Divine intervention into history through Prophets and Revelation. Human agency lies in their response to the Divine intervention, if they accept and act upon the message or not. Then there is also the role of direct Divine inspiration in the hearts of human beings, especially those who call upon Him in their supplication, in their intentions and actions. Further, God is not just the creator of all existence and the laws governing it, but He is also its sustainer. Meaning that He is not like a watchmaker who, once the automatic watch is made, is not needed anymore for the watch to function. Rather, the reality, the existence, matter and beyond, all are actively sustained through God's continuous provision in the Islamic perspective.

What is important to note here is that in the realistic Islamic worldview, all phenomena of the world, even miracles, are governed by certain objective principles; they are not beyond the causative logic. It affirms the possibility of a metaphysical/spiritual dimension to the world with norms and laws that are inter-related to the laws in the material dimensions. Furthermore, that humans can have access to these spiritual laws and norms just like they have access to those for the material dimensions. In fact, the Quran considers the governing principles of both natural and historical relams as well as spiritual dimensions all as part of the same reality and calls them God's "word", "sunnat", and "signs" in different contexts.

With regards to norms of history, for example, Sadr states: "...the Qur'an lays stress is the divinity of these laws and norms. Historical norms are divine in the sense that they have been appointed by Allah. The Qur'an has described them as Allah's words also. In other words every law of history is Allah's words. It is a divine rule. In order to promote man's dependence on Allah the Qur'an lays stress on the divinity and the sacred character of the historical norms. Man can enjoy the fruits of nature only with Allah's help. If he wants to enjoy the entire system of the world, he must act according to the natural laws and norms, for Allah operates His power through these norms which represent His will, wisdom and guidance."

(Trends of History in Quran, Lecture 6, "Field in which Norms of History Operate")

Further, according to Sadr, ‘the success of any activity involving social change depends upon certain concrete conditions and circumstances, and its objective cannot possibly be achieved unless these conditions and circumstances are realized’. Sadr makes a distinction between individual actions and ‘historical actions’. Humans can initiate individual actions, but for these actions to produce the desired effect on historical course, they need to be done through understanding the dynamics and limitations of external social conditions. Just like, how in the natural environment, Humans can bring about effective change (only) by understanding the laws that govern it.

C) The difference between the realistic and materialistic worldviews lies in this question: " 'If we accept an objective reality of the world, do we stop with objectivity at the limit of sensible matter, which would thus be the common cause of all the phenomena of existence and being, including the phenomena of consciousness and knowledge; or do we seep beyond it to a further cause, an eternal and an infinite cause, as the primary cause of what we know of the world, including both its spiritual and its material realms?' "

(Our Philosophy, Part II, Chapter One)

D) The Realistic worldview (also called theological realism) "accepts an external reality of the world and nature. Both spirit and matter, according to this notion, are attributed to a cause beyond the world and nature. "

E) "The theological notion of the world does not mean dispensing with natural causes or rebelling against any one of the sound scientific truths. Rather, it is the notion that considers God as a cause beyond [nature]. It imposes on the chain of agents and causes an ascent to a power above nature and matter. With this, opposition between it and any scientific truth is completely removed. The reason for this is that it gives science the widest opportunity for discovering the mysteries and order of nature.

At the same time, in the last analysis, it retains for itself the theological explanation which is the positing of a higher cause in a principle above nature and matter. Hence, the theological issue is not as its opponents wish to claim - namely, an issue concerning an invisible hand that sprinkles water in the atmosphere, that conceals the sun from us, or that acts as an obstacle between us and the moon, thus creating rain, a sun eclipse, or a moon eclipse. If science reveals the causes of rain and the factors leading to its evaporation; and further, if science also reveals the causes of the sun's eclipse, and [if] we know that the celestial spheres are not equidistant from the earth, that the moon is closer to them than to the sun, and that it happens that the moon passes between the earth and the sun, thus concealing the sun's light from us; again; if science reveals the cause of the moon's eclipse, which is the passing of the moon in the shadow of the earth - this shadow extends behind the earth for around 900,000 miles - I say that if this information is available to a human being, then those materialists will imagine that the theological issue will no longer have a subject, and the invisible hand, which conceals from us the sun or the moon, is substituted for by the natural causes given by science.

However, this is only due to the misunderstanding of the theological issue, and to the undifferentiation of the place of the theological cause in the chain of causes."

(Our Philosophy, Part II, Chapter One)

F) "...the Qur'an does not accord a hidden aspect to an event to sever its connection with everything else and attribute it direct to Allah. The Qur'an recognizes the existence of mutual relationship between various historical events in this world, but according to it this relationship is an expression of the wisdom and sagacity of Allah in regard to the creation and management of this world including the field of historical events.

To make this point clear and to illustrate the two points of view in this respect, we can use the following example:

Sometimes a man may say that it rains by the will of Allah. In this case he puts Allah's will in the place of natural causes as if he thinks that rain is a phenomenon which has no connection with any other happening and is directly attributable to Allah. This explanation of rain is different from its scientific explanation. Accordingly another man may say that the phenomenon of rain requires some cause and it is connected with other natural event. In fact there is a natural cycle of different forms of water. Water evaporates and converts into gas. Gases ascend and form clouds. The clouds gradually come down and with a change in temperature, again convert into liquid and rain. This series of natural events again represents Allah's wisdom and His good management of the affairs of the world, and there is no contradiction between the two explanations, although in the first explanation the mundane causes of the phenomenon have been ignored and the phenomenon has been attributed direct to Allah.

That is why the Qur'an, while according the norms of history a divine aspect, does not interpret history superhumanly alone. It only lays stress on the fact that the norms of history are not beyond the scope of the power of Allah. Their materialization depends on His will. Laws of nature are the words of Allah, His method and an embodiment of His will and wisdom in the world. They are meant to remind man to be always conscious of his dependence on Allah so that there may exist a close link between science and faith and man may look at scientific phenomena with the conviction of his faith in Allah.

The Qur'an believes in the basicity of the norms of history and does not regard any event as accidental. In many cases it considers even supernatural events to be subservient to the norms of history and not mere chance happenings. Accordingly even divine help is governed by the laws of history. In other words it is received only in appropriate conditions. In this sensitive spiritual field also the Qur'an insists on basing the interpretation of history on logic, reason and science, and not on unplanned aid. According to this interpretation divine help must be in conformity with the laws of history."

(Trends of History in Quran, Lecture 5, "Norms of History in the Quran")

G) "As for 'spiritualism' in the theological sense, or in the theological doctrine, it is a method of viewing reality as a whole, and not as a specific realm opposite the material realm. Hence, the theology that asserts a supernatural, immaterial cause also asserts a link between all that exists in the general realm - be that spiritual or material - and the supernatural cause. It believes that this link is one in whose light the human practical- and social position regarding all things must be determined. Spiritualism in the theological sense is a method for comprehending reality. It is equally applicable to the material realm and to the spiritual realm in the idealistic sense."

(Our Philosophy, Part II, Chapter One)

H) "... materialism is a philosophical tendency, as is theology. We do not have scientific or experimental materialism; for science, as we have learned, does not affirm the materialistic notion of the world in order that materialism be scientific. Rather, all the truths and secrets that science discloses about the sphere of nature leave room for the assumption of a cause above matter. Scientific experimentation cannot prove, for example, that matter is not created by an immaterial cause, or that the forms of movement and the kinds of development which science has discovered in the various aspects of nature are self-sufficient and not produced by a cause above the limits and sphere of experimentation. The same is true of every scientific truth. Therefore, the proof in support of materialism cannot be based on scientific truths or direct sense experience. Rather, it is formulated in a philosophical interpretation of those truths and experiences, precisely as is the proof in support of theology."

(Our Philosophy, Part II, Chapter One)

I) "The ... question is as follows: 'If scientific experimentation is not sufficient by itself for demonstrating the theological and the materialistic notions alike, then is it possible for the human mind to find evidence for any of the two notions, since both of them lie outside the realm of experimentation, or must the mind yield to skepticism, to freeze the theological and materialistic issue, and to limit itself to the fruitful field of science?'

The answer is that human intellectual capacity is sufficient for studying this issue and for commencing with respect to it from experimentation itself, not by considering experimentation as a direct proof for the notion which we form about the world, but as a starting point. Thus, the proper philosophical notion of the world - the theological notion - will be posited by the independent rational information in light of the interpretation of experiments and the experimental phenomena.

No doubt the reader remembers our study in the first investigation concerning the theory of knowledge of the rational doctrine, and how we demonstrated the presence of independent rational knowledge in a way that shows that the addition of rational knowledge to sense experience is something necessary not only with respect to our philosophical issue but also with respect to all scientific issues. There is no scientific theory that rests on a purely empirical basis. Rather, it rests on the basis of sense experience and in light of independent rational knowledge. Therefore, our philosophical issue that investigates the supernatural world does not differ from any scientific issue that investigates one of the natural laws, or that reveals some natural powers (p. 217) or secrets. In all of this, sense experience is the point of departure. But in spite of that, sense experience is in need of a rational explanation if a philosophical or a scientific truth is to be inferred from it."

(Our Philosophy, Part II, Chapter One)

From Our Philosophy (IV): The Logic of Science

Students of natural and social sciences should find the passage quoted from Our Philosophy in this post especially insightful.

Let me start off with a quick summary of what has been discussed so far. We have discussed Descartes' particular version of Rationalism, which is based on his Cartesian Method of doubt, also Hume's Empiricism, and then Berkeley's Idealism in the previous posts. It may be appropriate now to discuss the logic of scientific research in Shaheed Sadr's view.

That is, how do we obtain and ascertain knowledge about nature and its laws. In Sadr's view, the logic of scientific research is based on rational induction (see below). What is interesting about this discussion of rational induction is that it is applicable to both natural and social sciences, as we see that in the later chapters of Our Philosophy under the heading of a Realistic outlook of the world. In fact, Shaheed Sadr further expands this rational-realistic logic in his two other books, namely 'The Logical Foundation of Induction' (here, but translation not very good) and 'The Revealer, the Messenger, The Message' (here), to layout a unifying, common logic of scientific research in religious, social, and natural sciences. I will write more on the realistic worldview in my next post, inshallah.

What is this rational induction and how is it different from a purely materialist, sense perception/experiment based induction, here is what Shaheed Sadr says:

"We conclude from this that the empirical doctrine unavoidably leads to the elimination of the principle of causality and to the failure of demonstrating necessary relations between things. But if the principle of causality is eliminated, all the natural sciences will collapse, since they depend on it, as you will know.

The natural sciences, which the empiricists seek to establish on the basis of pure experimentation, are themselves in need of primary rational principles that are prior to experimentation. This is because the scientist carries out his experiment in his laboratory on limited objective particulars. Then he puts forward a theory for explaining the phenomena that the experiment in the laboratory had disclosed, and for justifying them by one common cause. This is exemplified in the theory that states that the cause of heat is motion, on the basis of a number of experiments interpreted in this way. It is our right to ask the natural scientist about how he offers this theory as a universal law applicable to all circumstances resembling those of the experiment, even though the experiment did not apply except to a number of specific things. Is it not the case, then, that this generalization is based on a principle stating that similar circumstances and things alike in kind and reality must share in laws and decrees? Here, once again, we inquire about how the mind reached this principle. The empiricists cannot claim that it is an empirical principle. Rather, it must be a piece of rational knowledge that is prior to experimentation. The reason is that if it were supported by experimentation, then the experimentation on which this principle is based also, in turn, treats only specific subjects. How, then, can a general principle be based on it? Thus, the establishment of a general principle or a universal law in light of one or more experiments cannot be accomplished except after admitting prior rational knowledge.

With this, it becomes clear that all the empirical theories in the natural sciences are based on a number of pieces of rational knowledge that are not subject to experimentation. Rather, the mind accepts them immediately. They are the following:

1. The principle of causality, in the sense of the impossibility of chance. That is, if chance were possible, then it would not be possible for the natural scientist to reach a common explanation of the numerous phenomena that appear in his experimentation.

2. The principle of harmony between cause and effect. This principle states that things that in reality are similar necessarily depend on a common cause.

3. The principle of non-contradiction that asserts that it is impossible for negation and affirmation to be true simultaneously.

If the scientist accepts these pieces of knowledge that are prior to experimentation, and then carries out his various experiments on the kinds and divisions of heat, he can, in the last analysis, postulate a theory for explaining the different kinds of heat by one cause, such as motion, for example. On the whole, it is not possible to postulate this theory as a decisive and an absolute one. The reason is that it can be such only if it is possible for one to be certain of the absence of another explanation of those phenomena, and of the incorrectness of explaining them by another cause. However, in general, this is not determined by experiments. That is why the conclusions of the natural sciences are, for the most part, presumptive, due to a deficiency in experiments, and to an incompleteness in the conditions that make them decisive experiments.

It becomes clear to us from what has preceded that the inference of a scientific conclusion from an experiment is always dependent on syllogistic reasoning in which the human mind moves from the general to the specific, and from the universal to the particular, exactly as viewed by the rational doctrine. The scientist is able to draw the conclusion in the above example by moving from the already mentioned three primary principles (the principle of causality, the principle of harmony, and the principle of non-contradiction) to that specific conclusion in accordance with the syllogistic approach.

Regarding the objection raised by the empiricists against the method of syllogistic reasoning- namely, that the conclusion in it is nothing but an echo of one of the two premises, that is, the major premise, and a repetition of it- it is a bad objection, according to the teachings of the rational doctrine. This is because if we intended to demonstrate the major premise by experiments, and had no other criterion, then we would have to examine all the divisions and kinds, in order to be certain of the soundness of the judgment. The conclusion then would have been also determined in the major premise itself. But if the major premise were a piece of rational knowledge, which we grasp without need of experiments, such as the primary intuitive propositions and the rational theories that are derived from such propositions, then he who seeks to demonstrate the major premise does not need to examine the particulars so that the conclusion is necessitated to take on the quality of repetition and reiteration.

Once again, we assert that we do not deny the great value of experience for humanity and the extent of its service in the fields of knowledge. However, we wish to make the empiricists understand that experiments are not the primary criterion and the fundamental source of human thought and knowledge. Rather, the primary criterion and the fundamental source are rational primary information, in whose light we acquire all other information and truths. Even experience itself is in need of such a rational criterion. Thus, we and others alike are required to admit this criterion on which the principles of our metaphysical philosophy are based. If, after that, the empiricists attempt to deny this criterion in order to falsify our philosophy, they would be, at the same time, attacking the principles that are the foundation of the natural sciences, and without which the empirical experience is completely fruitless.

In light of the rational doctrine, we can explain the quality of necessity and absolute certainty that distinguish mathematics from the propositions of the natural sciences. This distinction is due to the fact that the necessary mathematical laws and truths are supported by the primary principles of the mind, and do not depend on the discoveries of experiments. The scientific propositions are contrariwise. Thus, the expansion of iron due to heat is not one of the propositions that are given by those principles with no mediation, but is based on experimental propositions. The decisive rational character is the secret of the necessity and absolute certainty in the mathematical truths."

Source: Our Philosophy by Baqir Sadr. Trans. Shams C. Inati. See part I chapter I "The Primary Source of Knowledge."

From Our Philosophy (III): To Exist is to Know - Really?

How Can We Be Sure Of What We Know?

You may have seen a very absorbing presentation by the popular Turkish scholar, Harun Yahya, entitled “Secret Beyond Matter” (see here). And you might have noticed a similarity between his argument and the one presented by the idealist philosopher George Berkeley (A.D. 1685-1753), who argued that, philosophically speaking, we are incapable of proving the existence of any reality outside of our minds. I am sympathetic to Harun Yahya’s overall project – of pushing modern science and humanities to expand their intellectual horizon and of promoting general Islamic education through creative media – but regarding this particular issue I did not find him very convincing. I believe that the criticism that Shaheed Baqir al-Sadr (A.D. 1935-1980) made against Berkeley’s Philosophical Idealism in his wonderful book, Our Philosophy (see here), also applies to Harun Yahya’s argument. Below, I do not get into the specifics of Yahya’s presentation; I only discuss the overall framework of his argument that I believe is very close to philosophical idealism. I do encourage you to watch his presentation. Later in this piece, I touch upon the implications that this theory may have on our understanding of ourselves and the things that happen around us.

‘I Think, Therefore I Exist’ - Really?

First, let me discuss Rene Descartes (A.D. 1596-1650) because Harun Yahya starts his presentation by posing a problem similar to that of Descartes. That is, can we distinguish a dream from reality? In other words, how do we really know if any thing exists outside of our brains when we do not have a direct ‘touch’ with the essence of that outside world except through the signals that our physical senses send to our brains? For illustration, Descartes uses a piece of wax which is exposed to heat: We get different perceptions, different feelings, of its solid and liquid states through our five physical senses, but the actual ‘thing’ that is changing its physical state with changing temperature, we do not have a direct access to that essence or existence. Descartes pushes the argument further and poses a scenario: What if there is no reality out there and all that we consider to be reality are just signals artificially created and sent to our brains. For the purpose of illustration, imagine the mechanistic web or system in the movie, The Matrix, where individual brains were fed with signals suggesting an artificial, virtual reality. What if there is just one brain imagining all of that virtual experience? How can we be sure of what we know about reality?

Descartes’ thesis builds upon his famous Cartesian method of doubt, in which he becomes skeptical about the truth of all of his beliefs, not taking any reality for granted. From this point zero, he constructs an argument for, first, his own existence, then God, and all other external reality. The very famous argument, cogito ergo sum, “I think, therefore I exist” was proposed in this process. However, this argument has some serious logical flaws. In Our Philosophy, al-Sadr argues that Descartes pre-supposes the ‘individual being’ who is doing the thinking and also pre-supposes the ‘law of causality’ as an objective reality through the application of which Descartes connects the action of ‘thinking’ to the individual ‘being’. Al-Sadr states that Ibne Sina, or Avicenna (A.D. 980-1037), already presented this argument and criticized it “as being unfit as a method of scientific evidence for the existence of the human thinker himself” a few centuries prior to Descartes.

Descartes may not have been very successful at the solution, but the problem and the method of doubting reality that he constructed became quite popular, especially with the skeptics. Harun Yahya uses such a skeptic argument at the beginning of his presentation to problematize the empiricist scientific method or the material-istic theory of knowledge. The empiricist method presumes material objects to have an objective reality with real substance and governing laws. Following Descartes, Harun Yahya also argues that we cannot be sure of their existence. The alternative theory of knowledge that Yahya presents is very similar to Berkeley’s Idealism, and equally problematic.

‘To Exist Is To Know’ – Perhaps Not!

Now, let me discuss Berkeley’s Idealism, however, at the risk of simplifying it too much. Like Descartes, Berkeley questions our ability to know and validate any reality outside of our individual minds. He gives an illustration on the following line: Take two buckets of water, one with very hot and the other with very cold water. Put one hand in the hot, the other in the cold water. Now put both hands in a third bucket with water at room temperature. Each hand will feel different temperature of the same water because of its previous experience: the water will appear cold to the hot hand, and hot to the cold hand. But, is the water in the third bucket really hot and cold at the same time? On the basis of this apparent contradiction in sense perception, Berkeley argues that we cannot rely on the validity of our senses and any scientific knowledge built upon them. This is yet another construction of the skeptic argument, similar to Descartes’. Al-Sadr points out that Berkeley even goes to the extent of denying the objective existence of water when he draws out that contradiction in his little experiment. For him water is nothing but a name that we give to our sense perceptions.

To resolve this skeptic problem, Berkeley presents his Idealistic theory of knowledge. For Berkeley, ‘To exist is to know, or to be known.’ Existence of a thing has a different meaning in his philosophy, which is basically the idea or knowledge of that thing in our mind or soul. The source of that knowledge is God, who causes this idea or knowledge in our minds. Berkeley is vague in what exactly does he mean by ‘existence’, but if we try to understand his philosophy by reading it in its extreme idealistic terms, reality is but a continuous creation of perceptions or knowledge in our mind caused by God. Harun Yahya also appears to be arguing the same thing in his presentation.

But the fact that there can be error in the way we perceive nature does not automatically mean that nature does not exist. Rather, it is the fault of our sense perception and perhaps also of our inductive reasoning if we are not able to reconcile the different temperatures we get from the same water. In fact, the contradiction itself can be an argument to prove that there is an external reality (water) outside of our mind from which we are receiving mixed sense perceptions. While making this point, al-Sadr goes into a lengthy discussion on the problems with Berkeley’s theory in the second chapter of his book, under the sub-heading “Philosophical Idealism”. Al-Sadr’s solution to the skeptic argument is a Realistic Theory of Knowledge which is different from both a narrow empiricist (material-istic) epistemology – quite prevalent in modern science today – as well as philosophical Idealism. Al-Sadr elaborates this theory further, particularly its application in the domain of history and society, in his book, Trends of History in Quran (See here). The Realistic theory of knowledge accepts the possibility of an external world outside of individual minds along with its natural and metaphysical laws. It is also open to the possibility of vast and limitless realities beyond the material dimensions of the universe. I highly recommend you to read these two works for details.

Flawed Logic – So What?

Let me discuss a couple of problematic implications of philosophical idealism. This, I hope, will also highlight the relevance of this debate, especially for the students of science and humanities.

Consider the following illustration. You may have seen the movie, The Matrix. Recall the scene in which Neo meets a young boy who bends the spoon by changing the idea or knowledge of that spoon in his (boy’s) mind; Neo also sees this change. If reality only exists in one’s mind then the spoon should only bend for the young boy. But since Neo also sees this, then either Neo is also part of that young boy’s imagination and therefore the boy is able to manipulate Neo’s perceptions, or the two are experiencing a collective dream, but which has some objective dynamics and existence, outside of their individual minds, and the boy is merely manipulating those dynamics through his mind power. However, in case one argues that Neo is also part of the young boy’s imagination, this leads to a philosophical position known as Solipsism, which states that ‘the only thing that exists is my mind’ or ‘my mind is the only thing that I know for sure exists.’ Even God becomes merely a proposition – some would say, a mental construction – in this philosophical position. I believe that Berkeley and Harun Yahya both fall into this philosophical trap in their proposed theory of knowledge.

A very basic question that could be asked to the Idealists is that if we eliminate ‘I’ or ‘consciousness’ from the equation, does that mean the whole existence would not exist any more? Is that the right way to think about reality for the purpose of building our scientific and historical knowledge? Albert Einstein once said that “I think that a particle must have a separate reality independent of the measurements. That is an electron has spin, location and so forth even when it is not being measured. I like to think that the moon is there even if I am not looking at it.” But, following Berkeley and Yahya, if we assume that reality does not have an objective existence, we may not be able to study it from the perspective of objective nature and laws. The idealist theory of knowledge also does not provide an independent criterion to distinguish true propositions from false propositions we may have in our minds; for example, the idea of God vs. the idea of a pink unicorn. Hence Berkeley’s idealism doesn’t help much either in solving the skeptic problem of validating knowledge.

Consider another implication. God, no doubt, is the ultimate explanation for all occurrences in the world. God is the originator and sustainer of all creation. But the Idealistic perspective does not give us any objective criterion to differentiate between various occurrences, so we can increase our systematic knowledge of science and history, something toward which the Quran frequently draws attention of those who reflect (see, for instance, verses 2:164, 88:17-20, 7:185, and 50:6 in the Qur’an).

For example, the tragic Katrina and the catastrophic earthquake in the Iranian city of Bam both may have happened because God allowed, or caused, them to happen. But can we move beyond this general statement to understand how Katrina and Bam may have similar or different natural and/or meta-physical causes. Does the idealistic perspective give us any direction? And, further, can we demand an objective criterion or test from those idealists who like to call Katrina a wrath of God but consider the Bam earthquake as just a natural occurrence. (Or, those for whom both were punishments of God. Or, those for whom both were just natural occurrences, albeit caused by God). Granted, many times calamities befall on people because of their wrong doings. This general statement or metaphysical law is endorsed by the Quran. However, this statement by itself cannot prove that a specific calamity in a certain area happened as a form of punishment from God. The calamity could very well have been an effect of a natural process (the strain caused by underground tectonic plates, for example. Granted, the calamity could still be interpreted as a punishment. But it could also be a form of God’s test on a people. And there can be many more such interpretations). The idealistic perspective does not help much with making any such scientific or discursive distinctions. The realistic perspective at least would not allow any blank statements to be taken as decisive explanations, even if it may not always explain the meta-physical dimensions of such natural calamities.

The idealistic philosophy is similarly unsatisfactory for expanding our knowledge of physics, biology, medicine, criminology, historiography, and philosophy. Philosophical idealism has a certain attraction for some Sufi leaning philosophies. But this theory of knowledge does not take us very far in terms of developing a unified perspective of reality (material and non-material) and advancing human knowledge and capacities.

For a comparison of the Idealistic and the Realistic perspectives on the topic of ‘fate and destiny,’ see Shaheed Murtaza Mutahhari’s book, Man and His Destiny (see here). On biological evolution, see Mutahhari’s The Quran and the Nature of Life (here) and Shaheed M. Hosseini Behishti and Shaheed M. Javad Bahonar’s Philosophy of Islam (here). You may also want to read Allama Muhammad Hussain Tabatabai’s marvelous book, ‘Usoole Falsifae va Ravish-e-Realism’ (The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism), available in Farsi.

From Our Philosophy (II) - Cause and Effect

Descartes thought that he had solved the problems of knowledge with his Cartesian Method. In reality, he did not. The particular rationalist epistemology that he developed was later dismantled by empiricist theorists like David Hume.

For David Hume, all knowledge stemmed from sense perception and it can be the only criterion for knowledge. Sense perception refers to something empiricial, something that could be observed or experienced through senses, hence the name empiricist epistemology.

According to empiricist epistemology, we cannot establish the truth of any a priori knowledge without referring back to the knowledge itself, which would be the fallacy of circular logic. Hume, however, faced exactly the same problem with his starting point of knowledge, that is, the sense perception. What establishes its truth/validity? How do we know for sure what we experience through our senses does in fact exist out there? Recall from the previous post, the problem of distinguishing dream from reality. Hume doesn't give us any objective solution to get out of this problem. In the next post, you'll see that Berkeley, the Idealist philosopher, makes a similar criticism of sense perception.

Taken to its logical extreme, Hume's empiricist epistemology, as Shaheed Sadr argues, leaves us nothing but a form of nihilism, which is obviously not very helpful. Causality is one of the those fundamental problems that Hume had taken up but was unsuccessful in solving it due to the limitations of his epistemological method. See below.

Shaheed Sadr writes:

Causality as a Conceptual Idea

"David Hume, one of the advocates of the empirical principle, was more precise than others in applying the empirical theory. He knew that causality, in the real sense of the term, cannot be known by the senses. Because of this, he rejected the principle of causality and attributed it to the habit of the association of ideas, saying that I see the billiard ball move, and then encounter another ball that, in turn, moves. But in the movement of the former ball, there is nothing that reveals to me the necessity of the movement of the latter. The internal senses also tell me that the movement of the organs follows upon an order from the will. However, they do not give me a direct knowledge of a necessary relation between the movement and the order.

But the rejection of the principle of causality does not at all minimize the difficulty that faces the empirical theory. The rejection of this principle as an objective reality means that we do not believe that causality is a law of objective reality, and that we are unable to know whether the phenomena are linked by necessary relations that make some of them effects of some others. However, the principle of causality as an idea assented to is one thing, while the principle of causality as a conceptual idea is another. Suppose, for example, that we do not assent to the fact that some sensible things cause some other sensible things, and that we do not form an assent concerning the principle of causality, would this mean that we do not have a conception of the principle of causality either? If we do not have such a conception, then what is it that was rejected by David Hume? Can a human being reject something of which he has no conception?

The undeniable truth is that we conceive the principle of causality, whether or not we assent to it. Further, the conception of causality is not composed of the conceptions of the two successive things. When we conceive the causation of a specific degree of temperature for boiling, we do not intend by this causation an artificial composition of the idea of temperature and that of boiling. Rather, we intend a third idea that exists between the two. From where, then, does this third idea that is not known by the senses come, if the mind does not have the ability to create non-sensible ideas? We face the same difficulty with regard to the other notions mentioned earlier; since all of them are non-sensible. Thus, it is necessary to cast aside the purely empirical explanation of human conceptions and to adopt the dispossession theory (nazariyyat al-intiza)."

Source: Our Philosophy by Baqir Sadr. Trans. Shams C. Inati. See part I chapter I "The Primary Source of Knowledge".

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Causality as a Principle

"Fourth, the principle of causality cannot be demonstrated by means of the empirical doctrine. As the empirical theory is incapable of giving a sound justification of causality as a conceptual idea, so also is the empirical doctrine incapable of demonstrating it as a principle or an idea of assent. For experience cannot clarify anything to us except a succession of specific phenomena. Thus, by means of it we know that water boils when it is heated to 100 degrees [centigrade], and that it freezes when its temperature reaches below 0 degrees [centigrade]. As for one phenomenon causing the other, and the necessity between the two, this is something not disclosed by the means of experience, regardless of how precise it is and regardless of our repetition of the experience. But if the principle of causality collapses, all the natural sciences also collapse, as you will learn later.

Some empiricists, such as David Hume and John Stuart Mill, have admitted this truth. That is why Hume interprets the element of necessity in the law of cause and effect to be due to the nature of the rational operation that is employed in reaching this law. He says that if one of the operations of the mind is employed for the purpose of obtaining this law - adding that if one of the operations of the mind always leads to another operation that follows it immediately -then, with the passage of time, a constant strong relation, which we call 'the relation of association of ideas', develops between the two operations. This association is accompanied by a kind of rational necessity, such that the idea that is linked to one of the two mental operations occurs in the mind, as does the idea that is linked to the other operation. This rational necessity is the basis of what we call the necessity that we grasp in the link between the cause and the effect. There is no doubt that this explanation of the relation between the cause and the effect is incorrect for the following reasons.

First, from this explanation, it follows that we do not reach the general law of causality except after a series of repeated events and experiments that fasten in the mind the link between the two ideas of cause and effect, even though that is not necessary. For the natural scientist is able to infer a relation of causality and necessity between two things that occur in one event. His certitude is not at all strengthened [later] beyond what it was when he observed the event for the first time. Similarly, the relation of causality is not strengthened by the repetition of other events involving the same cause and effect.

Second, let us put aside two successive external events and turn our attention to their two ideas in the mind - namely, the idea of cause and that of effect. Is the relation between them one of necessity or one of conjunction, as our conception of iron is conjoined to our conception of the market in which the iron is sold? If it is a necessary relation, then the principle of causality is confirmed, and a non-empirical relation between two ideas - that is, the relation of necessity - is implicitly admitted. [In this case], whether necessity is between two ideas or between two objective realities, it cannot be demonstrated by sense experience. If, on the other hand, the relation is a mere conjunction, then David [Hume] did not succeed in explaining, as he intended, the element of necessity in the law of cause and effect.

Third, the necessity, which we grasp in the relation of causality between a cause and an effect, involves no influence at all on requiring the mind to invoke one of the two ideas when the other idea occurs in the mind. That is why this necessity that we grasp between the cause and the effect is the same, whether or not we have a specific idea about the relation. Thus, necessity of the principle of causality is not a psychological necessity, but an objective necessity.

Fourth, the cause and effect may be completely conjoined, yet in spite of that, we grasp the causation of the one on the other. This is exemplified in the movement of the hand and that of the pencil during writing. These two movements are always present at the same time. If the source of necessity and causality were the succession of one of the two mental operations after the other by means of association, then it would not be possible in this example for the movement of the hand to play the role of the cause loll the movement of the pencil; for the mind grasps the two movements at the same time. Why then should one of them be posited as a cause and the other as an effect?

In other words, explaining causality as a psychological necessity means that the cause is considered as such, not because in objective reality it is prior to the effect and is productive of it, but because knowledge of it is always followed by knowledge of the effect by means of the association of ideas. Due to this, the former is the cause of the latter. This explanation cannot show us how the movement of the hand becomes a cause of the movement of the pencil, even though the movement of the pencil does not succeed the movement of the hand in knowledge. Rather, the two movements are known simultaneously. Thus, if the movement of the hand does not have actual priority and objective causality over the movement of the pencil, it would not have been possible to consider it as a cause.

Fifth, it is often the case that two things are associated without the belief that one of them is a cause of the other. If it were possible for David Hume to explain the cause and effect as two events whose succession we often grasp, such that a link of the type of association of ideas occurs between them in the mind, then the night and day would be of this sort. As heat and boiling are two events that have succeeded each other, until an associational link developed between them, the same must be true of the night and day, their succession and their association, even though the elements of causality and necessity that we grasp between heat and boiling are non-existent between the night and day. The night is not a cause of the day, nor the day a cause of the night. It is not possible, therefore, to explain these two elements by the mere repeated succession which leads to the association of ideas, as Hume tried to do.

We conclude from this that the empirical doctrine unavoidably leads to the elimination of the principle of causality and to the failure of demonstrating necessary relations between things. But if the principle of causality is eliminated, all the natural sciences will collapse, since they depend on it, as you will know."

Source: Our Philosophy by Baqir Sadr. Trans. Shams C. Inati. See part I chapter I "The Primary Source of Knowledge".
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"Let us therefore, ask: 'What is habit?' If it is nothing but a necessity existing between the idea of the cause and that of the effect, then it is another expression of the principle of causality.

If, on the other hand, it is something else, then it is not different from causality in being an invisible idea to which we have no corresponding sense perception or reaction. But Hume must reject this [view], as he rejects all the truths that are inaccessible to the senses. In criticizing the empirical doctrine earlier, a response was given to this unsuccessful explanation of causality attempted by Hume. Therefore, let that [response] be attended to."

Source: Our Philosophy by Baqir Sadr. Trans. Shams C. Inati. See part I chapter II on "The Value of Knowledge".

Note: Also see "The Principle of Causality" in the same book, part II, chapter III. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle is one of the topics that Shaheed Sadr discusses in this chapter, under the sub-heading "The Principle of Causality and Microphysics."

From Our Philosophy (I) - Theory of Knowledge

Theory of Knowledge is known as Epistemology or Shenakht Shenasi (in Farsi). The basic questions in this branch of philosophy are: What is the nature of knowledge? How do we know what we know? How can we be sure about the things that we know? How do we prove the connection between what we know in our mind and what is out there in reality?

For example, how do you know that you are not dreaming all what you are experiencing now? How do you know for sure that right now you not are dreaming about reading from a computer screen?!

Our brains only receive signals through our five/six senses; they are not in direct touch with the essence of reality that is out there. How do we know that reality does exist out there and it's not a creation of my mind, or of some evil genius (as Descartes described in his elaboration of the problem). Think about the movie Matrix, which uses a similar idea!

Shaheed Sadr has discussed these questions in Our Philosophy in various sections. Although, he does not devote much time on expounding the theory of knowledge as developed in the Islamic tradition, his criticism of western philosophy gives us some idea of what an alternative epistemology would be like. His brief introduction to the "Dispossession Theory" as developed in the tradition of Islamic philosophy could be seen in Part I, chapter one of Our Philosophy. Readers of Farsi and Arabic should find more material about this theory in Allama Tabatabai's The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism, which I quoted in the previous post.


In the next few posts, I will share some critical passages from Our Philosophy on specific philosophical thoughts.

SELF AND BEYOND

So this joke came up in a conversation yesterday. On Descartes' famous argument, Cogito Ergo Sum, that is, ‘I think, therefore, I am’.

Descartes walks into a bar. The bartender walks up to him and says, "Would you care for a drink?" Descartes replies, "I think not," and disappears!!!

Joke aside, there are obvious problems with this argument. Does it really solve the problem of proving one's existence, philosophically speaking that is? Let me step back for a moment and quickly introduce Descartes' philosophical method, known as the Cartesian Method, which he meant to use in meta-physics (meaning: beyond physics), to establish a sound basis of knowledge/truth and to prove the existence of things, including those that are beyond matter, such as the existence of God and Soul.

Cartesian Method starts from a 'methodical doubt' about everything you previously believed in, including the laws of science, mathematical principles, and moral principles, even the belief (yaqeen) in your own existence. This method demands that you start from zero. Starting off at this point of nothing-ness, Descartes sought to prove his own existence by arguing that he knows for sure that he thinks. Even when he is in doubt, he is thinking. And an existence is required to do this thinking. Therefore, he must exist.

The obvious problem with Descartes' argument is that he assumes his own existence in the premise, that is, in the very first proposition of his argument. Let me quote a passage here from Shaheed Baqir Sadr's wonderful book, Our Philosophy (here), where Sadr makes a compelling critique of this argument, using Ibn Sina's (Avicenna) work.

"To begin with, we must know that the fundamental principle on which Descartes based his doctrine and philosophical certitude, 'I think, therefore, I exist', was criticized in Islamic philosophy a few centuries prior to Descartes' time. Ash-Shaykh ar-Ra'is, Ibn Sina, presented it and criticized it as being unfit as a method of scientific evidence for the existence of the human thinker himself.

A human being cannot prove his existence by means of his thought. This is so, because if by saying, 'I think, therefore, l exist', he wishes to prove his existence by means of his specific thought only, then he proves his specific existence at the outset and admits his existence in the very first phrase.

If, on the other hand, he wishes to make the absolute thought as an evidence of his existence, he is at fault, because an absolute thought asserts the existence of an absolute thinker, not a specific thinker.

Thus, the specific existence of every thinker must be known to him in a primary manner, regardless of any considerations, including his doubt and his thought."

Source: Our Philosophy by Baqir Sadr. Trans. Shams C. Inati. Part I, Chap 2 "The Value of Knowledge."

Later, Shaheed Sadr argues that even within the limitations of his logic of Methodical Doubt, Descartes couldn't have made a valid connection between his thought and his existence, without already believing in causality. That is, the simple and most fundamental principle that says that you need a cause to produce an effect. For the thinking (effect) to happen, you need a cause (a thinking being), Descartes assumed. But how could he take this principle for granted, if he is starting off at point zero, at nothing-ness? Hence, Shaheed Sadr argues that his Cartesian Method cannot take him a single step beyond this nothing-ness, unless he starts off with believing in a priori knowledge or self-evident truth of some fundamental principles.

Although a failed epistemology in itself, the Cartesian Method, more specifically the ‘methodical doubt,’ has inspired the thinking of many among the later theorists, not only in the fields of metaphysics and moral philosophy but also in philosophy of science, scientific research method, and even social sciences and humanities. The ‘methodical doubt’ leads to a kind of skepticism, or agnosticism if you will, if it remains unresolved. Of course, the politics of the time, that is, the 'Dark Ages' preceding the 'enlightenment movement', in which the Church suppressed free thinking and scientific knowledge, also had its influence on the preference for this mode of thinking (see Shaheed Mutahhari's related article(s) here on the causes of materialism in the west). I will write more on this and also quote a few passages from Our Philosophy in the following posts.

Here I want to emphasize on the following point: The theory of knowledge is at the roots of some of the very fundamental questions that we ask about our existence: a) Who am I? b) How do I see the world around me? c) What is the meaning of life? In other words, these questions refer to the knowledge of self, of the world, its Creator, the meaning and purpose of life, how should we interact with each other, what is the best social system to organize our societies, on what principles.

Shaheed Sadr recognizes the importance of theory of knowledge in Our Philosophy. His introduction entitled, “The Social Issue”, tells the reader that he is interested in addressing the social problems of society, but which, he thinks, cannot be solved in a meaningful manner without solving the problem of knowledge. Shaheed Sadr intended to solve this in Our Philosophy, which was meant to be the first of (at least) three books series, the second of which was Our Economics. Unfortunately, due to Saddam Hussein’s persecution and circumstances of the time Shaheed Sadr was never able to publish the third one, Our Society.

An important implication to consider is this: If Cartesian Method of Doubt or Hume’s Empiricist Epistemology or Dialectical Materialism (all of these are discussed/criticized by Shaheed Sadr in the same book) become the basis of our scientific and philosophical knowledge, they have their effects in shaping our social reality in a certain manner (which is what we are seeing today, as in, for e.g., the secular vs. religious divide in the scientific outlook and moral reasoning as seen in our textbooks. More on this in some post later on, inshallah).

The place to start therefore would be to develop alternative basis of knowledge, to discover such basis within our Islamic tradition and in benefiting from the philosophies of other civilizations. It would be a knowledge base that could effectively bridge the modern divides between secular and religious, rational and emotional, material and spiritual, and so on. Mulla Sadra and Allama Tabatabai's works could be seen as representatives of the tradition of Irfan, which seeks to bring together philosophy and spiritual experiences in the quest for knowledge and truth. Mulla Sadra and Allama Tabatabai's works could be seen as representatives of this tradition. Allama Tabatabai is the author of the famous Al-Mizan, a wonderful exegesis of the Quran, and the book 'Usool Falsifae va Ravish-e-Realism' (The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism). Shaheed Mutahhari, who was Allama Tabatabai's student, later added his hashiyeh or notes to this book.

Both Shaheed Sadr and Shaheed Mutahhari presented a Rational/Realistic theory of knowledge, formulated in opposition to an idealistic/fatalistic worldview on the one hand and a purely materialistic worldview on the other. Their theory of knowledge informed their analysis of many philosophical as well as social problems, as seen in, for example, their works on Human Free Will, on Hamasa (struggle for social justice) and Irfan, and on History and Social Change. Mutahhari: 'Man and His Destiny', 'Man and Universe', and Sadr: 'Trends of History in Quran', on the Realistic worldview, see Part Two, Chap One of Our Philosophy.