Orientalism, Then and Now

In my previous post, I argued that a critical engagement with the western cultural and academic discourse is necessary to counter their cultural hegemony. It is imperative for any such effort that we understand how knowledge is linked to power and what has been its various manifestations in the past and the present.

Perhaps the heuristic concept that has best captured this link is 'Orientalism' as introduced by Edward Said.

Orientalism

Edward Said uses the term Orientalism in his epochal work with the same name, which was published in 1978, to refer to a mental construct, a mindset, a culture that distinguishes and treats the ‘other’ in relation to the ’us’ in a particular manner. It refers to asymmetrical relationships of power between the ‘other’ and the ‘us’, in which the latter represents and controls the former.

Orientalism is the process of perceiving and producing knowledge in a certain manner, consciously or sub-consciously. It is a particular way of looking at ‘other’ cultures, peoples, and histories. The “East” or “Orient,” in this mindset, is seen as distinct, monolithic, and static and is judged in relation to an equally distinct and monolithic “West”. Of course, both such constructs belie the ground realities (see my post on many Wests here).

The underlying eurocentrism in this mindset assumes the West to be superior, modern, civilized, and at the center of the world. This particular mindset has direct bearing on power, in motivating and justifying different modes of domination, examples of which can be seen in the colonial occupations and the present day American and European quest for hegemony (cultural and political) over the rest of the world.

Edward Said re-defines the meaning of the word ‘Orientalist’ in his work and attaches a rather pejorative connotation to it so as to refer to those foreigners as well as natives who internalize this mindset and reproduce it in their writings and relationships of power. For foreign Orientalists, this mindset is one of self-righteousness, superiority, and modernization. Thus, their right to control the ‘Orientals’ and their responsibility to ‘civilize’ them. For the native Orientalists, this mindset is that of internalized self-depreciation, inferiority, and backwardness. Hence, their inferiority complex, slave mentality, and deference to the West.

I want to share a quote here from Mamdani’s Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (2005), in which he draws upon Edward Said’s work to describe the link between this mindset and power, both in the past and the present.

Mamdani writes: “Edward Said summed up “the principal dogmas of Orientalism” in his majesterial study of the same name. The first dogma is that the same Orientalist histories that portray “the West” as “rational, developed, humane [and] superior,” caricature “the Orient” as “aberrant, undeveloped [and] inferior.” Another dogma is that “the Orient” lives according to set rules inscribed in sacred texts, not in response to the changing demands of life. The third dogma prescribes “that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and scientifically ‘objective.’” And the final dogma is “that the Orient is at the bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible).”

There is reason to be hugely skeptical of claims that describe civilizations discretely and identify civilizational histories with particular geographies and polities. One has to distinguish between civilization and power. The very notion of an uninterrupted “Western civilization” across linear times is an idea that only arises from the vantage point of the power we know as the West. This power has both a geography and a history: that history stretches from 1492 through the centuries of the slave trade and colonization to the Cold War and after” (Mamdani 2005: 32-33).

Of course, it was the Orientalist cultural imagination, conscious or sub-conscious, that served as a justification and as a causal force, if partially, for the colonial expansion. Orientalism not only constructed “the other” for the western imagination, in which “the other” was objectified and de-humanized, and therefore, they could be treated differently; that is, they were not subject to the laws and norms of the “civilized world”. It also provided a (partial) motive and justification for colonial expansion and missionary efforts, in the name of “progress”, for the sake of civilizing the “uncivilized”, as the “white man’s burden.”

For a satirical yet poignant depiction of the selfish hypocrisy and moral weakness of colonial missions, see Joseph Conrad’s short story, “Outpost of Progress” here. The theme is more fully articulated in his Heart of Darkness.

A recent use of Orientalist cultural imagination is seen in the justifications made for invading Afghanistan. See Laila Abu-Lughod’s critical piece, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” here or here. Mamdani’s own work, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, also makes a strong case. Perhaps check out Hamid Dabashi’s critical review (here) of Azar Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran (2003) too. Dabashi illustrates how orientalist knowledge is linked to power and can serve the war mongering agenda. I especially liked his analysis of the cover of this book.